Abstract. Since the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) promoted the image of the Internet as 'interconnection ecosystem', Internet security has been increasingly conceptualised through the language of resilience-the capacity to selfrepair. This paper uses performativity and relational space as theoretical lenses to analyse the political effects that ENISA's redefinition of the Internet entails. It argues that the Internet ecosystem is not only used to conceptualise the Internet as a heterogeneous, complex space, but also to legitimise resilience as a new security practice. The first section traces the trajectory of different discursive framings of the Internet as space and introduces the premise of understanding the Internet ecosystem through performativity and relational space. The paper then utilises this framework to conduct an analysis of the Internet ecosystem on the basis of a selection of ENISA's technical and policy documents. It explores infrastructural and political dimensions and discusses their correlated forms of resilience governance. It concludes that the reconceptualisation of the Internet as ecosystem is a highly political move, which also changes the notion of security. If security governance becomes a matter of facilitating distributed self-repair, security is not a state of being protected, which is how we often think about cyberspace, but it is self-made, processual, emergent, and strictly temporal.
The rise of the 'Internet Interconnection Ecosystem'
Ever since the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) promoted the image of the Internet as an 'Interconnection Ecosystem'
(1) (ENISA, 2011a) , Internet security has been increasingly conceptualised through the language of resilience. Adopted from ecology (Holling, 1973) , the term resilience is understood as any action that reestablishes an unsettled equilibrium in complex systems. Network resilience thus refers to a steady state of the Internet, maintaining an acceptable level of service in the face of faults (ENISA, 2009 ). While resilience is thought to be inherent in networks, the focus of current governance efforts is to understand and strengthen this capacity (ENISA, 2011a) . Taking this shift in EU Internet politics as a vantage point, this paper asks: How does the 'Internet ecosystem' affect the understanding of the Internet as space, how does it legitimise resilience as form of organising this space, and what notion of security does this approach imply?
The reconceptualisation of the Internet as interconnection ecosystem, this paper argues, is a highly political move. By redefining the singular concept of cyberspace, originally an offspring from popular culture (Gibson, 1984) , ENISA promotes an understanding of the Internet as a heterogeneous space that is governed through resilience. This entails concrete consequences for the politics and practices of Internet security. The Internet ecosystem not only enables ENISA to enact particular resilience policies and suggest the EU as their central facilitator, but also implicates a specific understanding of security and of the way in which
(1) Below referred to as the Internet ecosystem if not quoted in full as 'Internet Interconnection Ecosystem'. security is actualised. Internet security is not the protection (2) of cyberspace, but in complex, uncertain, and ever-changing environments like the Internet ecosystem, security is an everemerging equilibrium: "The equilibrium (if we can call it that) arises from the behaviour of tens of thousands of independent networks, each seeking to maximise its own profits" (ENISA, 2011a, page 36) . In the Internet ecosystem, security is thus inextricably linked to insecurity: interconnectivity, decentralisation, and constant evolution create behaviour that is hard to predict and vulnerabilities of cascading failure (ENISA, 2011b) . Not only does this limit abilities to evaluate problems and prevent failure (Dunn Cavelty, 2007) , but the ecosystem's conceptual link to complexity promotes the idea of insecurity and vulnerability as system-inherent (Duffield, 2012; ENISA, 2011a; 2011e) . Insecurity becomes a structural part of the Internet and security is an active process of dealing with disruption on the lowest level possible.
In developing this argument, this paper follows an understanding of space, discourse, and governance as mutually constitutive: they bring each other into being (Foucault, 1986 ). Foucault's theorisation of discourse, matter, space, and governance as fundamentally entangled has inspired two theoretical arguments that this paper builds upon. First, performativity theories highlight the special role that language takes within the politics of discourse. Butler argues that language produces performative effects, meaning that the reiterative framing of the Internet as a particular form of space has the power to "produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains" (1993, page 2) . A second argument, building on Foucault and other poststructuralists, is the idea that space is not to be understood in Euclidian terms or singular ontologies, but that space is perceived, understood, and created by different groups. It is relational. Discourse is expressive of the imaginations and conceptualisations of spatiality, which again influence the way in which space is organised and governed. Space and discourse are thus closely interlinked with questions of power, which are also explored vis-à-vis the EU's reconceptualisation of the Internet as ecosystem. In order to explore its performative effect, this paper follows the reiterated expressions of the 'Internet ecosystem' and examines a range of documents that are central to the EU's approach to network resilience. Documents on the technical specifications of infrastructures are consulted to study infrastructural and material approaches to Internet resilience. Policy documents provide insights into the governmental logics that shape such spaces. Both types of documents are understood to form a larger discourse on the Internet ecosystem, which portrays the Internet as a complex space of in/security. The selected material includes different data sources, such as the European Commission's Digital Agenda for Europe;
(3) studies, technical reports, public interviews, policy papers, resolutions, and communications by the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament, the European Commission; but first and foremost ENISA.
The paper proceeds in three sections. Section 2 briefly traces the trajectory of different discursive framings of the Internet as space. It introduces the main theoretical premises of performativity and relational space, which provides the analytical basis for exploring the various dimensions of the Internet ecosystem, its actors, and its forms of governance. Section 3 deploys this framework to conduct a critical spatial analysis of the Internet ecosystem and its correlated forms of resilience governance. The Internet ecosystem is first described in terms of its material dimensions. The way in which the Internet's material arrangements give rise to political dimensions of space forms the second part of the analysis. It describes how the Internet ecosystem becomes a site of political struggle between diverse actors seeking to engender heterogeneous approaches of resilience governance. The paper concludes that framing the Internet as ecosystem is a political move, because it implies a reorganisation of power over connectivity and a specific understanding of in/security. Instead of stability and absence of disruption, insecurity in the dynamic Internet ecosystem is a permanent condition, and resilience is a modus of emergent, self-organized security. Thus, this paper ties in with existing critical discussions of resilience (Chandler, 2014; Evans and Reid, 2014; Joseph, 2013; Kaufmann, 2013; Zebrowski, 2009 ). However, it shifts the focus from the resilient subject (Dunn Cavelty et al, 2015; Joseph, 2013; Reid, 2012) to spatial arrangements and the resilience politics they constitute.
2 Discourse and the spatiality of the Internet: from cyberspace to the ecosystem Arguments about the spatiality of the Internet vary vastly and they are more often than not expressed by a specific terminology. To begin with, one could argue that the Internet is simply perceived as space, because it is reflected in our language. Online, spatiality is experienced in the form of landmarks, such as websites. The distances between these landmarks are experienced through retrieval times and clicks. These perceptions are relative, but once they are hardwired, the perceived spatiality is inscribed into our language (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; 1999) . We can find examples of spatial vocabulary in our everyday expressions, such as upload, download, and navigation. Users of the Internet not only go back and forth in order to visit platforms, but the spatial perception of the Internet is also anchored in political language. According to the European Commission, traffic within cyberspace is in need of direction (Commission of the European Communities, 2009), and data are moved to clouds (European Commission, 2010b) .
Discourse theory further explores the effects of such conceptualisations and terminologies on the perception and organisation of the Internet as space. A vast variety of discourse theories goes back to Foucault, who found that discursive practices "form the objects of which they speak" (1972, page 49). As a branch of discourse theory, performativity theory focuses specifically on the "reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names" (Butler, 1993, page 2) . This does not mean that a one-time formulation of a concept necessarily changes or creates an object, but the repeated use of a concept over time, so Butler argues, influences contents, representations, identities, and political practices related to that concept (cf Bialasiewicz et al, 2007) . Performativity is, however, to be distinguished from those constructivist approaches that place agency exclusively within language. Such constructivist theories would position the subject itself outside of the domain of construction (Bialasiewicz et al, 2007) . According to performativity theory, discourse and subject are mutually constitutive, reducing agency to neither the subject, nor language alone. Performativity theory is also used to explore how discourse influences both ideal and material conceptions of space (cf Bialasiewicz et al, 2007; Nash, 2000) .
To what extent a concept, spatiality, and related practices are coconstitutive can also be traced by looking at the terms that have been chosen to describe the Internet. The topology of the Internet is as contested as its terminology. Early online activists relied heavily on the term 'cyberspace', arguing that it was "a world that is both everywhere and nowhere, but it is not where bodies live" (Barlow, 1996) . In a similar way, some of the first legal scholars to work on Internet law claimed that in cyberspace territorial borders and sovereignty are absent (Johnson and Post, 1996) , which disconnects it from real-world orderings. While current image searches (4) of cyberspace seem to reflect this understanding of a space The increasing focus on the Internet's physical reality also led to a critique of the term cyberspace, which was considered as too ethereal by some scholars. As a response to the early debates on Internet regulation, legal scholar Goldsmith (1998) argued, for example, that the Internet is 'just a network' (coined by Cohen, 2007) in which transactions are no different from real-space transactions, since they are connected to real-space territories and jurisdictions, which permit regulatory control.
(5) Using the term 'Internet' rather than cyberspace, other geographers further fostered the infrastructural, material facet of spatiality by analysing private and public provider networks in the US (Gorman and Malecki, 2000) or the spatial patterns that emerged from the investments in fibre-optic lines and upgrades (Malecki, 2002) . One of the latest popular examples tracing the physical geography of the Internet is Blum's 'tubes' (Blum, 2012 )-a term which equally foregrounds the material aspect of the Internet:
" For all the talk of the placelessness of our digital age, the internet is as fixed in real, physical places as any railroad or telephone system ever was. In basest terms, it is made of pulses of light. Those pulses might seem miraculous, but they're not magic. They are produced by powerful lasers contained in steel boxes housed mainly in unmarked buildings. The lasers exist. The boxes exist. The buildings exist" (Blum, 2012, pages 9ff) . Poststructuralist geographers argue, however, that conceptualisations of the Internet as neither cyberspace, nor 'just a network' are exhaustive. The 'just a network' position fails to address the way in which the Internet is created by each user, and the Internet is not as abstract, singular, and ethereal as the word cyberspace suggests. They generally refer to and understand the Internet as characterised by multiple spatialities.
A broad scholarship following Foucault, Latour, Law, and Deleuze understands space not as static, but as relational and processual. Spaces are what they are because of their participation in relationships (Malpas, 2012; Massey, 2011) .
" Instead, then, of thinking of places with boundaries around, they can be imagined as articulated moments in networks of social relations and understandings, but where a larger proportion of these relations, experiences and understandings are constructed on a far larger scale than what we happen to define for that moment as the place itself" (Massey, 1994, page 154) . This allows for an understanding of space as in flux, heterogeneous, and placed in diverse networks on the one hand, and as territorially institutionalised, standardised, and characterised by a stable set of relations on the other (Murdoch, 2006) . Even though poststructural approaches to space have emerged from research on urban geographies (cf Hart, 2002; Ward and McCann, 2011; Wise, 2005) , they are now applied to the conceptualisation of the Internet as a heterogeneous space. This enables a study of the various elements that make up the spatiality of the Internet, including the human, nonhuman, organic, inorganic, technical, natural, online, offline, and all the stages in between (Murdoch, 2006; Wakeford, 1999) . Most importantly, relational space is also an expression of critique. By understanding the Internet not as a single ontic space, but as a network with highly selective connections (5) The legal discourse on Internet regulation has profoundly developed since then. For an insightful account of legal approaches to cyber as/and space, see Cohen (2007) . (Graham, 2013) , it becomes possible to point to the broad variety of digital divides and the uneven topologies that are dependent on the positionalities of each potential user. These unequal network geographies are tied to and reinforce "existing social, economic and political power structures" (Graham, 2011, page 223; cf Brunn and Dodge, 2001; Zook, 2005; ).
Graham's investigation of Internet access shows that a critical analysis of space is also a critical analysis of power (Graham, 2011; . Space and power, Foucault (1979) argues, are mutually constitutive, because power is tied to knowledge that specifies how particular sites should be organised. Power is thus as heterogeneous as space itself. Various kinds of power can coexist; they are neither centrally governed, nor equally distributed (Anderson and McFarlane, 2011; cf Deleuze, 1988; Doel, 1996; Foucault, 1988) . In acknowledging that "space is fundamental in any exercise of power" (Foucault, 1986 , page 252; see also Murdoch, 2006 ) relationality allows for a study of the variety of power relations that appear in heterogeneous spaces. It enables a critical assessment of the various governmental rationales and techniques that seek to regulate a space. Finally, relationality also ties spatiality back to discourse: space is an instantiation of power, knowledge, and discourse (cf Foucault, 1979; 1986) that is relative to and influenced by the different concepts that seek to describe and organise it.
Understanding space as relational, heterogeneous, and intimately tied to discourses that describe and organise it, in the following paragraphs I will examine what an articulation of the Internet as 'Internet Interconnection Ecosystem' (ENISA, 2011a) implies. Relationality and performativity are used as methodological tools that enable the critical assessment of conceptualisations of space and how they are tied to power structures. They draw attention to the kind of knowledge and the rationalities that specific conceptualisations imply and to the particular strategies deployed to organise this space. Precisely because the Internet ecosystem is a political attempt to capture the heterogeneity and topological complexity of the Internet itself, it invites us to study the different kinds of power at play and the variety of rationales that are combined in the organisation of this space. The following section will take a snapshot of the various materialities, actors, processes, knowledge-productions, and power-structures that determine the Internet ecosystem and critically discuss resilience as its correlated technique of governance.
A spatial analysis of the Internet ecosystem
In 2010 the Digital Agenda for Europe identified the Internet as a global critical information infrastructure that "must be resilient against all sorts of threat" (European Commission, 2010c) . In response, the idea of fostering resilience became the main focus of ENISA's (2011a) report "Inter-X: resilience of the Internet Interconnection Ecosystem". The various documents that embrace and promote the notions of the Internet ecosystem and resilience as a political strategy include a number of reports, directives, and agreements, but also interviews and media reports. The choice to redefine the Internet as an ecosystem is not just an attempt to capture and describe the heterogeneity of the Internet. It becomes expressive of a specific form of space that necessitates resilience as an approach to Internet security governance. As such, the term is not only descriptive, but performative. It serves as a political leitmotif that is productive of a particular form of Internet governance. The subsequent analysis explores how ENISA's resilient ecosystem describes the Internet as a specific space with interrelated infrastructural and political dimensions. It illustrates what kind of performative effects the conceptualisation of the Internet as ecosystem entails.
The section is subdivided in two parts: it first discusses the material and infrastructural aspects of ecosystemic space that is constructed, created, and designed by a multitude of engineers, technology providers, and political actors. This material dimension of the ecosystem follows concrete design elements such as multiplicity and diversity, which create not only a heterogeneous whole, but also ambiguities. Since the organisation of a space is always related to power, the resilient ecosystem also creates a political dimension that is constantly in the making. Thus, the material and political dimensions of the ecosystem support each other. Emphasising the power-related aspects that are interwoven with ecosystemic space, the second half of this section describes this political dimension as heteroscapes of power. It explores the techniques of resilience governance that are being negotiated and practised, touching upon issues of regulation and the interplay of local responsibility and global standardisation.
The Internet ecosystem as a space of heterogeneous infrastructures
ENISA's redefinition of the Internet as ecosystem seeks to take account of the continuous modifications that take place here. It describes the Internet as an assemblage of ever-changing and diverse infrastructures that are designed, physically built, programmed, and constructed by designers, engineers, and diverse end users. The infrastructural dimension of the Internet ecosystem not only refers to wires, cables, and servers, the geographic properties of which are mapped in physical network topologies. It also includes the communication architectureslogical topologies-that direct the way in which the different physical devices communicate with each other through protocols. This interplay of physical and logical layers is changing constantly. The Internet Mapping Project by William Cheswick and Hal Burch, for example, illustrates in a gallery of maps how the Internet's infrastructure is continually expanded and how paths of data flow change steadily (http://www.cheswick.com). Even though maps seem to stabilise the Internet as something concrete and manifest, infrastructural spaces are not a fixed, univalent reality (Graham, 2011) , but continuously constructed by those who trace, engineer, and define them. The term Internet ecosystem seeks to reflect exactly this fluidity of the heterogeneous whole: "Its shape changes all the time, as new connections are made, or existing connections fail or are removed" (ENISA, 2011a, page 8).
The term, however, not only expresses that the Internet is an ever-transforming, heterogeneous space; it also underlines the complexity that this setup entails. This emphasis on material complexity implies concrete rationales about the security of the system. According to ENISA the major security challenge in the ecosystem is the "large number of separate, but interconnected local issues" (2011a, page 8). Due to this interconnectedness, the Internet is prone to cascading disruption (page 8). This suggests the concept of a tightly woven, dynamic net in which boundaries between intended and unintended effects are blurred and where disruption may lead to far-reaching and cascading emergencies. Complexity furthermore complicates the detection of risks (ENISA, no date), which renders the Internet prone to faults and challenges. Its increasing number of components, its openness, and its flexibility render the Internet inherently insecure (cf Dunn Cavelty, 2007) and vulnerable (ENISA, 2011a) .
For ENISA, resilience is thus the most evident modus of dealing with this complexity, because it refers to "the ability to adapt [itself] to recover from a serious failure, or more generally to its ability to survive in the face of threats" (ENISA, 2011a, page 10). Resilience is profiled as the answer to uncertainty-inducing complexity. At the limits of risk calculation and prevention, the concept of resilience seeks to embrace uncertainty about future disruptions and responds to threats that cannot be averted in time. The language of ecosystemic resilience implies that the Internet's equilibrium is reestablished as quickly as possible after disruption occurs. The equilibrium is then an expression of security in a system that is always in flux. The term ecosystem thus conceptualises the Internet as a dynamic, heavily interdependent, and constantly evolving space (page 10), but-unlike single ontic spacesit comprehends insecurity and disruption as its permanent condition. The exposure to uncertainty is part of the Internet ecosystem's ontology as it evolves through the constant interplay of disruption and equilibrium, which is enhanced by resilience. Thus, security is an activity rather than a state. It is something that constantly needs to be established in relation to ontological insecurity.
ENISA's framing of the Internet as ecosystem thus not only emphasises heterogeneity and complexity and ties it to rationales of uncertainty, it also suggests concrete strategies to strengthen the resilience of the Internet's material dimension. Resilience is advanced through ecosystemic infrastructures that can accommodate disruption and establish the equilibrium after insecurities have materialised. ENISA's main approach to building and engineering this infrastructural resilience follows principles of flexibility and redundancy (ENISA, 2009) . Flexibility is enhanced by building 'headroom' (EINSA, 2011b, page 16) or multiple and diverse redundancies for each component. Redundancies are extra spaces and interconnections, which are included in the individual component parts of the infrastructure. Such buffers are used for so-called 'load-sharing' or 'failover' (page 6) through backups that allow for the circumvention of disrupted nodes. Engineering resilience is thus a technical solution of preparedness, which snaps into action as soon as disruption hits. Building additional interconnections, so ENISA argues, allows for the local storage of information and the switching between alternative media of data transmission, which enables the continued operation in the event of failure (2011a, page 17). Redundancy and flexibility-by-design thus require multiple components and forms of operations which are characteristically diverse to promote self-repair and adaptation. This illustrates that insecurity, disruption, and flexibility are all anchored in the material spatiality of the Internet's technical design, since alternative interconnections are engineered on the presumption that disruption will occur. Unlike a protection model, which seeks to avert disruption, resilient systems seek to enhance multiplicity and diversity in order to absorb and respond to disruption after it appears and before it can cascade.
Multiple and diverse infrastructures, however, not only support a network's resilience, they also enhance complexity. This means that dealing with complexity also adds to complexity, especially when different devices and services are owned by a variety of providers. In March 2011 the Internet already accommodated 37 000 autonomous systems, such as Internet service providers (ENISA, 2011a). The multiplicity of local resilience approaches and autonomous systems can, ironically, reinforce the potential for disruption. In 2013, for example, the technology magazine Wired published the results of a worldwide survey on IT complexity. More than half of the respondents from mid-sized enterprises and organisations stated that "complex policies ultimately led to a security breach, system outage or both" (Baron, 2013; cf Algosec, 2012) . The approach to enhance resilience through diversity, multiplicity, and redundancy thus adds to the complexity and the potential for insecurity that the concept of the Internet ecosystem accentuates.
This problem of adding complexity, furthermore, entails practical challenges. ENISA argues that " [m]ost of the things that service providers can do to make the Internet more resilient … benefit other providers much more than the firm that pays for them, leading to a potential 'tragedy of the commons'. Similarly, security mechanisms...are not implemented because no-one has found a way to roll them out that gives sufficiently incremental and sufficiently local benefit" (ENISA, 2011a, page 4). Originally discussed in the contexts of resource management and global warming (Hardin, 1968) , the tragedy of the commons is yet another ecological concept that is applied to Internet security and which implies its own rationality about the impossibility of the organisation of a complex space. It foregrounds the missing local benefits for security providers as a problem that necessarily arises from the complexity of the Internet and the attempt to enhance resilience. Complexity then becomes a practical problem for providers, not only as a source of disruption, but as a problem for which resilience is not a cost-effective solution. Resilience engineering may benefit others more than the party that invests in it, it may have no effect if implemented on too small a scale, or-in the worst case-it has detrimental effects if it enhances the complexity of Internet policies, all of which translates into practical apathy and the impossibility of organising a complex space.
The way in which ENISA's reconceptualisation of the Internet as ecosystemic space embraces complexity then becomes a problem that is potentially detrimental to ENISA's own cause. The discussion has furthermore indicated that the 'Internet ecosystem' not only refers to material solutions, but also includes political dimensions and rationalities that seek to organise this space. The internet ecosystem becomes a site for the production and extension of power, which is further discussed below.
The Internet ecosystem as a heteroscape of power
The ecosystem not only reconceptualises the Internet as a space of heterogeneous infrastructures; but the term is also interpreted and filled with different contents by its diverse stakeholders. Analyst Demchak argues that each element of networked space is established, maintained, or disposed of by someone, whether it be "designers, abusers, social controllers, trend watchers [or] users" (2012, page 261; cf Goldsmith and Wu, 2006) , all of whom may have their own conception of Internet resilience. The concept ecosystem combines various political actors and rationales and multiple approaches to resilience, which form the political dimension of ecosystemic space. The ecosystem is thus a heteroscape of power, a heterogeneous site of political approaches and power negotiations. Here, power lies not only in the ability to be connected, which is already unevenly distributed, but also in the control over connectivity and the standards according to which this connectivity is governed. Processes of negotiating control over such standards involve actors from at least three administrative domains: national and subnational institutions, referred to as local actors; the EU as a superordinate body; and private actors. According to ENISA's documents, all of these actors play different roles in making the ecosystem resilient. Some of the prominent rationales and approaches to Internet resilience are explored below, also to shed light on the tensions that arise from them.
The concept of resilience itself places emphasis on local approaches to deal with disruption, which is why resilience policies often entail a redistribution of responsibilities from centralised to local actors (cf IFRC, 2012; Kaufmann, 2013; UK Cabinet Office, 2013) . A similar redistribution is also suggested for the context of network security, since rapid collaborative action and sense-making from fragmented information is difficult to achieve over long distances (Demchak, 2012) . The local approach is also in line with EU Internet resilience policies (http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP). Politically, the local emerges as a new domain for response and responsibility. According to the European Commission's communication on critical information infrastructure protection, the EU member states remain ultimately responsible for defining critical information-infrastructurerelated policies (Commission of the European Communities, 2009). Subsidiarity, the key organising principle of European Union politics, reflects and encourages the distributed approach of resilience. Political decisions are handled at the least centralised authority capable of addressing the problem effectively. In fact, even subnational organisations and institutions such as NGOs, and citizens and individuals, are being asked to define and register and issues in order to enforce accountability (Bendiek, 2012) . Internet resilience is thus a collective effort, with an emphasis on local response.
The documents and studies accompanying the Commission's communication 149 on Internet security and resilience make clear, however, that most of the implementation work remains to be done (Commission of the European Communities, 2009). Because local strategies have grown organically, the EU member states have unequal approaches to Internet resilience, reflecting varying levels of expertise and preparedness (Council of the European Union, 2009), which again gives rise to the other side of the EU's approach to Internet resilience. Since "no member state is an island" (Council of the European Union, 2009, page 15), European Union policies repeatedly stress the limited realm of action for single member states when it comes to managing and securing global connectivity. Unequal standards, ENISA argues similarly, make local policies at times ineffective or even counterproductive (ENISA, 2011a) .
According to ENISA and the Council of the European Union, the global nature of the Internet requires a holistic and systemic approach to network and cross-border information security and resilience (Council of the European Union, 2009; ENISA 2011c). This means that distributed responsibilities are politically desired and considered effective only as long as they share certain universal standards. Because differences in national approaches reduce the effectiveness of Internet security measures (European Commission, 2010d), global codes of conduct and systematic cross-border cooperation become a necessity. The Commission's communication 149 thus promotes the effort to harmonise the diverse approaches to Internet resilience while keeping responsibilities at the local level (Commission of the European Communities, 2009)-an approach that summarises ENISA's resilience politics in the Internet ecosystem.
Several activities have been undertaken to accomplish exactly this harmonisation, such as conducting exercises, devising a global code of conduct, supporting strategic cooperation, establishing a common language and standardising the definition of gaps. So far, two pan-European exercises have been conducted, taking place in 2010 and 2012 under the name 'Cyber Europe'. Member states are also invited to conduct regular exercises on a national level (Commission of the European Communities, 2009; European Commission, 2010d) . Another EU approach to harmonising the constantly evolving and uneven policies of cyber resilience is to define a common language. ENISA has set up agreements about shared resilience conceptualisations and vocabulary that can be used by people and systems, so-called ontologies and taxonomies of resilience (ENISA, 2011d) . Harmonisation is also suggested in terms of the identification of technological gaps in standardisation related to Internet resilience, reaching from protocols and domain name systems to file formats. Yet, ENISA requires the commitment of many other institutions to implement these standardisation efforts, such as the European Committee for Standardisation, the International Organisation for Standardisation and the nonprofit organisation Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, which coordinate, for example, the addresses of domains (ENISA, 2009).
According to ENISA, a common language and the definition of standards, however, are only some aspects of fostering the cross-border policies that are needed for a transboundary infrastructure such as the Internet ecosystem. Some documents identify the need for a minimum of cooperation agreements and information exchange mechanisms inside the EU (ENISA, 2011c). The harmonisation of Internet resilience approaches is thus advanced through best practice guides and cooperation contracts between member states, an example of which are mutual aid agreements. Such agreements are made between two or more parties concerning provisions "for lending assistance across normal boundaries during an emergency situation" (ENISA, 2011e, page 3). These formalised agreements are supposed to have important "benefits over ad hoc approaches, since they enhance contacts that extend beyond a few personal relationships" (page 1), which may not be sufficient in a crisis. Since these agreements seek to overcome "regulatory, legal and competitive barriers-both real and perceived", they emerge as a central means of achieving emergency preparedness and Internet resilience (pages 1ff ).
While distributed localism and global standardisation may seem like contradicting logics at first, they are captured by the ecosystemic rationale that combines local actors in one overarching, complex system that follows a set of harmonised rules. This combination of localism and standardisation also features similarities of technical coordination and control within networks. In networks, shared values and goals are controlled through common protocols. Protocols define what it means to be included in the network. At the same time the aim of protocols is to optimise the joint operation of two layers within a complex whole. This stresses the role of local self-organisation, as the functioning of higher layers is dependent on the self-sufficiency of lower layers (Galloway and Thacker, 2007) . Protocols are thus a form of guided self-organisation that is also visible in ENISA's promotion of the 'self x' logic that regulates the ecosystem:
" To deal with the increasing complexity of systems and uncertainty of their environments, networking has turned to [the] self x concept that can be read as self-reconfiguration, self-optimising, self-diagnosing, self-healing, self-protecting, self-organization, selfforming, self-adaptivity or self-management. Self x leverages wireline and wireless systems and provides transmission resiliency resulting in an autonomous behaviour. The self x features and facilities relate to both hardware and software. All such solutions work with feedback loops that probe the whole infrastructure" (ENISA, 2011b, page 31).
'Self x' expresses that every part of the Internet ecosystem is increasingly included in resilience efforts. The Internet ecosystem is not flexible enough if it has resilient endpoints only, but each component of the system plays a part in avoiding cascade or failure (ENISA, 2011b ). This form of guided self-management is also reflected in ENISA's resilience policies of global standardisation described above. According to ENISA, distributed decision making, local responsibility, and coordination between two member states are key to Internet resilience, but in order to work in a heterogeneous whole, they also need shared values, goals, and global standards. Thus, the term ecosystem enables ENISA not only to express already existing heterogeneity and the combination of localism and standardisation, but also to enact the associated practices.
This ecosystemic approach to Internet security, however, entails aspects that are in need of critical discussion. As much as harmonisation efforts and global standards enable distributed localism, they also constrain them by limiting variety and locally grown approaches: " Efforts to build new forms of distributed localism are both enabled and constrained by the form and content of technical standards, and the politics of distributed localism in turn enable and constrain the technical evolution of network standards" (Cohen, 2007, page 254) . The approach of combining standardisation with the distribution of responsibilities eventually leads from diversification to homogenisation. Should global standards not be met, the selfresponsible local institution suffers the harmful consequences in case of emergency and also the penalisation for not conforming to common regulatory standards. If the local institution is responsible to fend for its own connectivity, it is also responsible for its own exclusion from a network should it not be able to conform. If nonfunctioning or infected nodes fail to selfrepair, they are actively blocked, circumvented, or excluded from the overarching network (He et al, 2011) . If the same exclusive form of protocological control applies to political institutions, digitial divides are broadened if institutions cannot comply with standards. The idea of a global Internet would be undermined. It is also worth considering to what extent excessive homogenisation can threaten the stability of the ecosystem, which-as discussed above-relies on diversity to some degree. For the moment, the EU does not discuss the potential negative effects of homogenisation, but rather points to the benefits of global standards.
The combination of local responsibility with centralised standardisation entails, most importantly, a concrete political consequence: a supranational leader is needed to implement global standardisation. Power lies with those who define what the global standards are; it is "the power of the standards of the network over its components" (Castells, 2009, page 43) . By conceptualising the Internet as an ecosystem that is in need of a coordinating, harmonising body, the very act of reconceptualisation works performatively to emphasise the EU's role as the facilitator of cooperation and developer of global standards. While acknowledging the difficulty of achieving Europe-wide governance models, diverse EU documents identify a course of action for the EU with opportunities for collecting and integrating information of national weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and gaps as well as the definition of governance roles and responsibilities, which could create a direct positive impact (Bendiek, 2012; Council of the European Union, 2009; ENISA, 2011e) . This central coordination and facilitation would add value to the national programmes for Internet security which are already in place in the member states (Council of the European Union, 2009). These documents and formulations are clear attempts to stabilise the EU's position within the Internet ecosystem, suggesting it plays one of the most powerful roles as the central coordinator and facilitator of its overall resilience activities.
Achieving the role of the facilitator is not, however, simply done by means of a declaration. Whereas current approaches to disaster resilience tend to emanate from a central political organ, which redistributes responsibilities and knowledge to smaller and more local units, knowledge and authority within the Internet already are distributed and held by a multitude of stakeholders. Because this distribution has grown organically, it is now difficult to determine which central organ defines and manages shared values and goals.
There is, however, a lag between rhetorical commitments to expanding the EU's role in Internet politics and the actual transfer of authority to Brussels (Boin and Rhinard, 2008) . Furthermore, the expertise for defining and implementing shared standards lies within the private sector. Bendiek (2012) stresses that knowledge is a weak resource within governments, and EU bodies alone do not have the capacity to determine agendas and shape processes. It is the expert knowledge of the private sector that is decisive for consensus-building within a multilevel, multistakeholder structure. As a result, the desired shift of power towards the EU as a facilitating and coordinating actor is not a self-evident one. Furthermore, given the current movement towards a multistakeholder convergence of the public and the private, a public steering body such as the EU would have to harmonise diverse national approaches to Internet resilience with those of private actors. However, neither market forces nor standardisation efforts by public bodies have provided sufficient incentives for the private sector to invest in the resilience of critical information infrastructure (Council of the European Union, 2009). An additional question is whether public-private partnerships, even though they have evidently become an important mode of sharing responsibilities, may lead to politically precarious dependencies, precisely because public authorities would rely on information from and implementation of standards within the private sector and security would become a matter of private initiative. Furthermore, the collection of network vulnerabilities and the implementation of standards by the private sector may not only help to enhance resilience, but may also be used for other purposes than security: for example, nurturing commercial interests. There is, thus, a need to discuss whether the private sector should influence public security policies. As a result, the Internet ecosystem becomes a site of political struggle over responsibilities between national, supranational, and transnational actors.
This discussion has shown that the EU shares the struggle over power in its selfconstituted Internet ecosystem with other actors, such as the private sector and national actors. The Internet is thus not only a heterogeneous space, but a highly contested one. It is a space that does not necessarily translate into a coherent whole. It gives rise to various technologies, actors, and techniques of governance that do not always work according to the desired global standards. Together, they form a heteroscape that is currently characterised by rationales of diversity, distribution, and localism on the one hand and standardisation and centralised facilitation on the other. Power here lies in the control of cooperation and connectivity in a heterogeneous whole. This notion of power over standards largely overlaps with Castells's idea of networked power (1996; 2009) . On the basis of empirical analysis and the resulting heteroscape of power, however, this paper draws conclusions about the enactment of power that expands on Castells's. Power in complex systems and networks is not merely enacted by the systemic inclusion and exclusion of passive nodes (Castells, 1996; Luhmann, 1984; cf Stalder, 2006 )-or in this case of actors, actors that either comply with specific policies or not. The determination of standards provokes an active struggle over power. This discussion has illustrated that various actors enter into this power struggle and interfere with the EU's plans to enact resilience and become the central coordinator of distributed activity.
Conclusions
This paper has analysed the theoretical, political, and practical effects of ENISA's reconceptualisation of the Internet as interconnection ecosystem. This paper has followed the idea, expressed in performativity and relational space theory, that the understanding of space is closely linked to the discourses that describe it and the way in which actors relate to space through experience, practices, and concepts (Bialasiewicz et al, 2007; Butler, 1993; Massey, 1994; Murdoch, 2006) . Reconceptualising the Internet as ecosystem is thus an act which influences the way in which different actors relate to this space and actively construct it.
For ENISA, the strategic value of using the term 'Internet interconnection ecosystem' (ENISA, 2011a) is that it embraces heterogeneity and seeks to provide for the governance of a space that is not only complex and distributed, but in flux. This means that the very ontology of the Internet ecosystem incorporates characteristics of diversity and flexibility, but also insecurity, since sources of disruption are difficult to know. This ontological insecurity constitutes both reason and reasoning for ENISA's Internet security politics, and resilience arises as the answer to governing the Internet ecosystem. ENISA's reconceptualisation of the Internet as ecosystem and introduction of resilience as a mode of governance thus legitimise a range of concrete security practices, introducing new security actors and security rationales. Therefore, this reconceptualisation is a highly political move.
A significant structural effect of recasting the Internet as ecosystem is that security actors are concerned less with the immediate protection of 'cyberspace', and more with procedures that regulate the efficient cooperation of the system's heterogeneous and resilient parts. Within the diverse and ever-changing stakeholder setup of the Internet ecosystem, the EU seeks to stabilise its position as a central actor that fosters the responsibilisation of the local on the one hand, and manages collective interests on the other (cf ENISA, 2011a). The role of this central security actor becomes that of a facilitator who administers standards, while the active responsibility for establishing resilience lies with the local actors, such as national governments or infrastructure owners, who act in accordance with overarching principles. Not only does the ecosystemic logic influence the political praxis of Internet security, but this shift in roles and procedures in security governance encounters practical challenges; it involves a change in the political reasoning about security and transforms the understanding of security itself.
Firstly, it remains to be seen whether the suggested form of standardisation, of creating harmonised principles for Internet security, is really practicable. Since the Internet ecosystem grew organically in the first place, the heterogeneity and diversity of its components can challenge the applicability of universal standards. Furthermore, the power to decide these standards is not a concern of public actors alone, but also involves private parties. This multistakeholder setup turns the question of centralised facilitation and standardisation into a struggle over power on the one hand, and a fight against the tragedy of the Internet commons on the other.
Secondly, the formulation of security standards is a political decision with the power to normalise what it means to be secure. Any part of the system that fails to live up to these standards is then useless, weak, or threatening and needs to be blocked, circumvented, or excluded. In combination with the idea of the 'self x' logic, the idea of local self-organisation, Internet resilience then involves a particular political rationale about security. The combination is expressive of a larger trend towards advanced liberalism in security politics that prioritises the evolution of the system as a whole by means of its competing, self-governed single parts (cf Joseph, 2013; Kaufmann 2013; Reid, 2012; Zebrowski, 2009 ), which are excluded or blocked if they do not follow pregiven standards.
Thirdly, by embracing the concept of the ecosystem, fluidity and insecurity are accepted as the predominant state of existence, which grants resilience a reason to exist in its own right. Resilience in turn is characterised by the constant interplay of disruption and response, which is fundamentally different from security as the protection of singular ontologies associated with cyberspace. Security understood through resilience is thus not a passive state of being protected from harm, but it becomes an active mode of dealing with harm. In contrast to Reid (2012) , who argues that resilience governance abandons the idea of security completely, this paper traces how security is redefined as a process rather than a state. Because of the idea of continuous and active adaptation, resilience is productive of a self-made, emergent, and strictly temporary notion of security.
The paper recommends an evaluation of recent moves to apply ecosystemic concepts and resilience approaches to any kind of complex security context and spatiality. On the basis of the analysis conducted above, the paper suggests critical assessments, pointing to the effects that such redefinitions have on space, the governmental logics that organise spaces and their related tensions and ambiguities, as well as the forms of security they produce.
